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byDavid E. Wilkins 
Jun 13, 2003 
“The vaccination will come from the same society as the disease.” – Leonardo Vitteri 
“The Master’s tools will never dismantle the Master’s house.” – Audre Lord 
These two powerful and contradictory epigraphs reflect the two dominant sentiments 
held by a majority of Native nations when they are asked to assess their historic and 
contemporary political and legal status vis-?-vis the United States. 
Some adhere to the idea that the federal government, as a democratic state 
founded on the rule of law, contains within its legal and political institutions 
and ideologies a framework that provides the necessary vaccines that will 
eventually cure the various and sundry indigenous ailments generated 
throughout American society by its social, economic, political and legal 
institutions. 
By contrast, there are others who vigorously argue that the prevailing 
institutions of governance and law of the United States are incapable of 
providing justice to First Nations because they entail systems, ideologies, and 
values that represent non-Indians and thus they cannot possibly adequately 
address the distinctive aboriginal, treaty, and trust based rights of indigenous 
nations. 
On balance, the historical record is far more supportive of the Audre Lord 
quote, given the devastating territorial, treaty, and identity losses Native 
peoples have and continue to endure at the hands of the federal, state, and 
increasingly, even county governments and their largely non-Native 
populations. 
This sorry legal and human rights record has prompted a movement by an 
increasing segment of First Nations folk to pursue international recognition of 
their cultural and political rights and natural resources. I applaud this effort, 
even though it, too, is fraught with real difficulties given the structural 
arrangement of the United Nations – it was created to represent states, not 
indigenous nations. 
While international status will continue to be pursued, First Nations are also 
intimately bound, both territorially and by treaty, to the United States 
domestic legal and political systems and are required to utilize those 
institutions – and their own – as well, despite the ongoing structural and 
ideological barriers that are pervasive in federal and state institutions of 
governance. 
I’d, therefore, like to focus on one of the few legal doctrines that has proven to 
be of some merit to indigenous peoples in their quest for domestic peace, 
tranquility, and justice since it is generally regarded as one of the most 
important doctrines undergirding the treaty and trust rights of indigenous 
nations – the reserved rights doctrine. On its face, this doctrine is less 
problematic than those of plenary power, discovery, trust, or good faith since 
the word “reserve,” is the root word of the “reservations” that constitute a 
fundamental aspect of the Indian and U.S. relationship. 
Broadly defined, reservations are tracts of land expressly set aside or reserved 
for Indian nations by tribal insistence and some federal action. Many 
Americans have at least some vague notion and will concede, if reluctantly, 
that although Indian tribes “lost,” “surrendered,” or “sold,” most of 
homelands to the United States, railroads, states, and enterprising whites, 
they rightfully retained through sheer determination or liberal federal Indian 
policies, smaller regions designated as “Indian reservations.” In fact, with 
summer upon us, American tourists are already trekking to reservations in 
search of indigenous culture and identity. 
Interestingly, these same Americans, however, are sometimes taken aback or 
in some cases become irate when tribal nations and their citizens move to 
assert reserved rights – be it a property right like the right to hunt, gather, or 
fish, or a political right like the power to regulate domestic relations, tax, 
administer justice, exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction, among others. Why 
these Americans will concede the greater reserved right (recognize tribal land 
ownership) but refuse to recognize the lesser rights (rights to tribal property 
or treaty or civil rights) is a most interesting phenomenon, and speaks to the 
ongoing schizophrenia the American public and many of their lawmakers 
exhibit towards First Nations. 
From a non-Indian perspective, it comes down to a broader question of 
whether tribal nations reserve all those powers and rights that they have not 
surrendered, or whether they may exercise only those rights that have been 
delegated to them by express act of Congress? This crucial question, 
unfortunately, has no definitive answer from the United States’ perspective, 
depending, it seems, on the whim of individual justices, congresspersons, or 
BIA officials. 
But Vine Deloria Jr., the leading scholar of Indian law and policy, adopts a 
more historically accurate vision of the reserved rights doctrine. He, in fact, 
describes the comparability of the reserved rights clause contained in the U.S. 
Constitution’s 10th Amendment with that lodged both expressly and implicitly 
in Indian treaties (and agreements and statutes) where tribal nations reserved 
all those powers, rights, and resources not expressly surrendered to the 
federal government. 
The 10th Amendment, ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights, declares 
that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people” (emphasis added). Of all the amendments demanded by the Anti-
federalists in the state conventions that ratified the Constitution, “the one 
calling for a reserved powers clause was most common.”  
Although many Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and 
James Wilson, did not believe such an amendment was necessary, the fear of 
central authority was widely felt and support for an express guarantee that the 
states would retain control over their internal affairs proved irresistible.  
The 10th Amendment, which embodies the principle of federalism, has been 
both eroded (Civil War and the Great Depression) and embellished (years 
preceding the Civil War and under the Rehnquist Court, which emphasizes 
dual federalism) over time, but states may generally rest assured that at any 
given time at least some of their inherent sovereign powers are respected and 
that their existence as distinct polities having been constitutionally 
established will be protected. Furthermore, states certainly need never fear 
being “terminated” as political entities, a reality that was forced upon some 
tribal nations in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Indian treaties, similarly, reserve to Indian tribes all those powers specifically 
stated and those not expressly ceded away. As a federal district court said in 
Makah Indian Tribe v. McCauly, in interpreting a key provision of the 1855 
Makah Treaty, “this court is of the opinion that as contended by plaintiffs 
(Makah) the answer to this question as to the treaty’s validity turns upon the 
sounder theory that the treaty granted nothing to the Indians, but that the 
treaty in truth and in fact merely reserved and preserved inviolate to the 
Indians the fishing rights which from time immemorial they had always had 
and enjoyed” (emphasis added). 
In both cases, the states and the tribes have struggled to retain as much of 
their original governing powers and rights as could be done in the face of an 
ever-expanding national government. Even as the commerce and welfare 
clauses became the chief mechanisms for federal intrusions on state 
government, the trust doctrine became the major device used by federal 
lawmakers to diminish or squelch indigenous self-determination efforts. The 
treaty, however, according to Deloria, performs the same function for First 
Nations as does the 10th Amendment for state governments. 
Of course, state powers, tribal nations have learned, have more permanence 
because they are constitutionally enshrined, while Indian treaty rights, 
according to the Supreme Court, “can be altered without recourse to the 
constitutional amendment process.” It is the fragility, the tenuousness of 
Indian reserved rights, despite their treaty pronunciation, that is most 
problematic, particularly since tribes were not created by the U.S. 
Constitution and theoretically are not subject to constitutional limitations.  
How the federal or state governments can justify their abridgements of Indian 
reserved rights, given the extra-constitutional nature of tribes, the fact that 
treaties are constitutionally recognized as “the supreme law of the land,” and 
the persistence of the federal trust doctrine, raises important questions of 
fairness, justice, and intergroup relations. Moreover, if we see tribal 
sovereignty as a bundle of inherent powers then it is clear that First Nations 
arrived at the treaty negotiating table with a similar body of powers enjoyed 
by other sovereign nations. Our task then, is simply to identity what specific 
attributes of sovereignty tribes have ceded away, recognizing that they reserve 
all other powers, both external and internal to themselves. 
The reserved rights doctrine is often listed with three other so-called canons 
of construction as evidence that the federal government sometimes supports 
Indian treaties and the trust doctrine. The other canons are 1) that 
ambiguities expressed in treaties are to be resolved in the Indians favor; 2) 
that treaties are to be interpreted as the Indians themselves would have 
understood them; and 3) that treaties are to be liberally construed in favor of 
the tribes. 
But each of these “canons,” which theoretically stand for a system of 
fundamental rules and maxims which are recognized as governing the 
interpretation of written instruments, are not really canons at all since each 
has an opposite corollary that may be cited by the courts when it suits the 
justices purposes. For instance, while the “canon” of liberal construction for 
tribes is supported in cases like Worcester v. Georgia (1832), The Kansas 
Indians (1866), and United States v. Winans (1905), it has been ignored or 
shunted aside in cases like The Cherokee Tobacco (1871) and Race Horse 
(1896). And the canon of ambiguous phrases, other cases have held, does not 
permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist, nor does it permit the 
disregarding of the expressed intent of Congress. 
More conclusively, the fact that Indian treaties themselves may be expressly 
abrogated by Congress reveals the tenuous nature of Indian legal rights and 
the fact is that history shows that treaties – including Indian reserved rights – 
have been honored more in the breach than the fulfillment. Nevertheless, 
tribal nations and their treaty and trust recognized reserved rights persist, 
despite their inconsistent recognition and sporadic enforcement by the U.S.  
David E. Wilkins, Lumbee, is a Professor of American Indian Studies at the 
University of Minnesota. 
 
 
